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SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY: THEIR PUBLIC




On the night of October 22, 1989, eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling rode his
bicycle to the local video store along with his brother and a friend.' The trip was
sanctioned by Jacob's parents, who were out for the evening at a house-warming party.2
The boys lived in a small Minnesota town of less than three thousand inhabitants,
a place best known for its "porch swings, stone churches and candy-striped barber
poles."3 Accordingly, the boys' trip that night was deemed safe; the video store was
less than ten minutes away by bicycle.4
The boys, however, were not safe that night. Returning home from the video store
they were stopped by a man standing in the street holding a gun.5 The man ordered the
boys off their bikes, and told Jacob's brother and his friend to run away quickly or they
would both be shot.6 Jacob was not as lucky. Upon turning to run, one of the boys saw
the man grab Jacob by the shoulder.7 When they found it safe to look again, Jacob and
the man were gone.8 Jacob Wetterling disappeared that night.
Jacob's disappearance became national news. Local law enforcement officials
brought in state and federal agencies to help track down Jacob and his kidnapper?
The entire Midwest was soon aware of Jacob's abduction.' The Wetterling family
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2007; A.B., Harvard University, 2002. I wish
to thank the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal editors and staff for their assistance with
this Note. I also wish to thank my family for their guidance and support.
See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 3 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov-
bjs/pub/pdflncsor.pdf [hereinafter SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES]; Troops Join in Search for
Boy, 11, Governor Calls out Minnesota Guard, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 29, 1989, at5B.
2 See SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 1, at 3.
3 Dirk Johnson, Small Town Is Shaken by a Child's Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1989,
at A10.





9 See Minnesota National Guard to Join Searchfor Kidnapped Boy, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 29,
1989, at C3.
'0 See SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 1, at 4.
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received an outpouring of support both publicly and privately." For example, the
Minnesota Vikings wore "Jacob's hope" hats on the sidelines at a home game while
simultaneously projecting Jacob's picture on the stadium's giant video screen.'2 Unfor-
tunately, these efforts were not successful and Jacob remains missing to this day.'3
Eighteen months after Jacob's disappearance a man was arrested for burglary in
St. Cloud, Minnesota. 4 Upon running a criminal background check, law enforcement
officials discovered that the man was a previously convicted sex offender.'5 Further,
the St. Joseph police learned that in October, 1989 the man had lived closer to Jacob's
abduction site than did the Wetterling family; yet, local police had not been aware of
his presence within the community." In fact, unbeknownst to local police at the time
of Jacob's disappearance, there were halfway houses in the St. Joseph area that housed
sex offenders upon their release from prison."' This information was disconcerting
because during the search it was commonly assumed that Jacob's kidnapper had
attempted similar behavior in the past.' The St. Joseph police lamented that prior
knowledge of the presence of these previously convicted sex offenders may have
prevented Jacob's abduction in the first place."'
A. The Legislative Response to the Sex Offender Debate
Congress responded to this tragedy, and others like it, by passing the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Program, "the Wetterling Act," as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce-
ment Act of 1994. 20 The Wetterling Act required individual states to establish ex-
tensive sex offender registration programs to record the locations of convicted sex
offenders within their jurisdiction.2' Congress considered the federal registration
"l See id.
12 Id. The NBA's Minnesota Timberwolves planned to donate the proceeds from their first
home game to the search for Jacob Wetterling. NBA Update, USAToDAY, Nov. 9, 1989, at 10C.
1 See SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 1, at vii.




8 See id. (providing a copy of the FBI profile that suggested that Jacob's kidnapper was
probably a previous sex offender, a white male twenty-five to thirty-five years old with some
type of physical deformity, and was likely to work at an unskilled job).
'9 See id.
20 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000).
21 See id. § 14071 (a)(1)(A) (establishing guidelines for states requiring persons "convicted
of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or who is convicted of a sexually violent
offense to register a current address" for a specified time period); see also H.R. REP. No.
103-392, at 5-6 (1993) (defining a criminal offense against a minor as "any criminal offense that
consists of kidnapping or false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent; soliciting or en-
gaging in criminal sexual conduct toward a minor, or engaging in any conduct that by its nature
[Vol. 15:653
SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY
program a legitimate use of government authority because its stated purpose was to
protect public safety.22 This objective was accomplished by providing law enforce-
ment officials with a list of the addresses of those individuals who previously had been
convicted of violent sex crimes.23 Congress also asserted that the registration require-
ments did not violate any fundamental rights possessed by the affected sex offenders.24
The Wetterling Act was amended in 1996 to include a community notification
statute.25 Congress determined that community notification was necessary to protect
the public, and thus authorized the public disclosure of relevant information about those
individuals forced to register under the Wetterling Act.26 The amendment was called
Megan's Law in honor of seven-year-old Megan Kanka, who was raped and killed by
her next-door neighbor, a twice-convicted sex offender.27 Megan's Law was perceived
as an effective tool in promoting public safety because it enlisted community aid to
help prevent the occurrence of sexually violent crimes.2"
B. Pertinent Sex Offender Data
As of late 2005, there were roughly 550,000 registered sex offenders in the United
States.29 In general, sex offender data is quite limited, and it is only recently that
is a sexual offense against a minor; using a minor in a sexual performance; soliciting a minor to
practice prostitution; or attempting to commit any of these offenses if the State has made such
an attempt a criminal offense and includes such an offense in their registration program").
22 H.R. REP. No. 103-392, at 5 (1993) ("The Committee believes that protection of children
from violence and sex offenses falls clearly within the Federal government's purview in pro-
tecting the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. The guidelines created in this bill serve
a legitimate Federal governmental purpose.").
23 See id. at 4 ("Registration of convicted felons, especially sex offenders, reentering a
community is one control States have used to deter repeat offenses and protect children from
victimization. The highly repetitive nature of these crimes has provided a strong incentive
for States to monitor the whereabouts of convicted sex offenders.").
24 See id. ('There is little doubt as to the authority of the States to impose registration re-
quirements upon sex offenders. Courts have found that registration requirements do not violate
the eighth amendment, and do not violate the due process clause, the equal protection clause,
or the constitutional rights to privacy or travel." (citations omitted)).
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(1) (amended as of May 17, 1996).
26 See id. ("The information collected under a State registration program may be disclosed
for any purpose permitted under the laws of the State."); id. § 14071 (e)(2) ('The State or any
agency authorized by the State shall release relevant information that is necessary to protect
the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section, except that the
identity of a victim of an offense that requires registration under this section shall not be released.
The release of information under this paragraph shall include the maintenance of an Internet
site containing such information that is available to the public and instructions on the process
for correcting information that a person alleges to be erroneous.").
27 See SEX OFFENDER REGIsTRIEs, supra note 1, at vii.
28 See id.
29 Wendy Koch, Despite High-Profile Cases, Sex CrimesAgainst Kids Fall, USATODAY,
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studies have focused specifically on sex crimes.30 There are certain facts, however,
upon which most crime analysts will agree. It is clear that the majority of all sexual
assaults in this country are inflicted upon juveniles." The majority of their assailants
are adult males.32 It is also evident that the majority of young victims are assaulted by
persons with whom they are acquainted.33 Moreover, most young victims are sexually
abused in residential settings. 34 Finally, evidence suggests that recidivism among
convicted offenders is high, and rehabilitation often fails among the most violent of
sex offenders.35
These numbers support the theory that convicted sex offenders are a widespread
danger to communities and thus pose a real threat to the safety of those most targeted,
children. In recognition of this threat, there is a potent public debate regarding the most
efficient means to combat the plague of sexual offenses.36
It is within this debate that state legislatures have enacted the aforementioned sex
offender registration and notification programs to serve the noble purpose of pro-
tecting communities and preventing future tragedies at the hands of sexually violent
Aug. 25, 2005, at IA.
30 See HOwARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHIL-
DREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARAC-
TERISTICS 1 (2000) (suggesting that only recently have legislators and law enforcement
officials acquired "hard facts on which to base their response to [sex] crimes, their victims,
and their offenders"), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf.
"' See id. at 12 ("[C]rimes against juvenile victims are the large majority (67%) of all sexual
assaults handled by law enforcement agencies."); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDER STATISTICS (noting that in 1994 the median age
of the victims of all imprisoned sex offenders was less than thirteen years old), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm [hereinafter CRIMINAL OFFENDER STATISTICS].
32 See SNYDER, supra note 30, at 8 (concluding that nearly all (96%) reported sex offen-
ders were male, and another large majority (77%) of sex offenders were adults).
13 See id. at 13 ("Rarely were the offenders of young juvenile victims [characterized as
children under twelve] strangers.").
3" See id. at 6 (determining that over eighty-three percent of all young victims were assaulted
in residences).
15 H.R. REP. No. 103-392, at 4 (1993) ("Evidence suggests that child sex offenders are
generally serial offenders. Indeed, one recent study concluded the 'behavior is highly repeti-
tive, to the point of compulsion,' and found that 74% of imprisoned child sex offenders had
one or more prior convictions for a sexual offense against a child." (citations omitted)). But
cf. CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS, supra note 31 (noting that of the 4,300 convicted child
molesters released from the prisons of fifteen states in 1994, only 3.3% of them were rear-
rested for a sex crime against a child within three years); Koch, supra note 29 (stating that
sex "offenders are less likely to be rearrested after prison for any type of crime than other
former inmates").
36 See generally Lydia Saad, Sex Offender Registries Are Underutilized by the Public,
GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, June 9,2005, http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci= 16705
&pg= 1 (arguing that the effectiveness of sex offender registries may depend on the extent to
which the public is aware of the existence of these registries).
[Vol. 15:653
SEX OFFENDERS IN THE COMMUNITY
criminals.37 The preceding paragraphs have served to provide an overview of the
compelling debate surrounding convicted sex offenders and their place within the
community. It is a debate that inflames passions on all sides of the equation, and ulti-
mately rests on this fundamental question: Can our loved ones be safe when such
dangerous persons are allowed to reside in our communities and often in our homes?
C. The Note's Premise
The focus of this Note, however, rests on a much narrower issue. If the govern-
ment asserts a right to notify the public of the existence of convicted sex offenders in
the community, does the media possess a similar right to pursue the same goal? Specif-
ically, does the media face liability when discussing the plight of sex offenders and
their victims, or is the media assigned a fundamental right to share with the govern-
ment the burden of community notification? This Note will establish the claim that
the media is entitled to notify the public of the presence of convicted sex offenders
in the community.38
To support this supposition, the media's right to notification will be examined
through two congruent legal disciplines: the First Amendment and the public figure
doctrine. First, it will be argued that the First Amendment protects the media from
liability when reporting on issues that are of public concern. 39 This argument will
include an examination of the powerful tension that exists between the media's right
to report on matters of public concern and the individual's right to privacy.4 In re-
solving this issue in favor of the media, an analysis of case law validating the media's
First Amendment protective shield will be considered in conjunction with relevant case
law that confirms that a sex offender's right to privacy is outweighed by the public
interest in community awareness and protection.41
37 See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
38 For the purpose of this Note, it is assumed that the type of information upon which the
media may legitimately report should follow the registration and notification guidelines estab-
lished under the Wetterling Act. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000). Specifically, the
media's right to publicize sex offender information should adhere to Congress's definition
of the pertinent information that the FBI may release to the public under the principle of com-
munity notification. Accordingly, the media should be able to report on only "relevant infor-
mation concerning a person required to register under [a community notification statute] that
is necessary to protect the public." 42 U.S.C. § 14072(f)(1). Generally, the term "relevant
information" comprises information that is already part of the public record, including the
convicted offender's sexual offense, current address, place of employment, etc. See infra text
accompanying note 104. Such information is already included within sex offender registration
databases, and thus media coverage will not serve to expose the convicted sex offender, but
rather will serve as an additional means to notify the public. It is important to note, however,
that analogous to the guidelines established under the Wetterling Act, the media should have
no congruent right to report on the names of the victims of the publicized sex crimes. See 42
U.S.C. § 14072(f)(2).
'9 See infra Part I.
40 See infra Part I.A-B.
41 See infra Part I.A-D.
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After determining conclusively that the media has the right to notify, the anal-
ysis will then shift to an examination of the media's potential liability for defaming the
reputations of those persons affected by public notification. This examination will
focus on defamation law and the tort liability that the media might incur for notifying
the public of the potential safety threat. 2 This liability could potentially weaken the
media's resolve to publicize the status of resident sex offenders, a scenario that would
muzzle the freedom acquired in the First Amendment discourse. Immunizing the
media from liability, therefore, will become a matter of vital importance to the success
of the overall argument.
Fortunately, the mechanism to immunization is found in the public figure doctrine
expounded most noticeably within defamation law.43 By analyzing the public figure
doctrine through a series of relevant cases, it will be determined that convicted sex
offenders are accurately deemed public figures. 44 This outcome will take into con-
sideration the alleged lack of voluntary action that sex offenders exhibit upon being
thrust to the forefront of the public controversy surrounding their presence in the
community.a The retort to this criticism will conclude that convicted sex offenders
are that elusive class of persons who are involuntary public figures.46 Consequently,
by attaining public figure status, sex offenders will hesitate to initiate defamation law-
suits against potential media adversaries because of the high standard of liability that
is accorded media entities when discussing the plights of public figures.47
Upon reaching the conclusion that convicted sex offenders are legitimate public
figures, dual benefits will result. First, the sex offender notification programs will
attain their ultimate purpose of protecting the public by allowing the dissemination
of pertinent information through the most efficient mediums. Second, the media's
First Amendment right to report on matters of public concern will be upheld, which
is a powerful interest necessary to ensure that a vigorous debate on important public
issues remains sacred.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
First Amendment 8 analysis adheres to the notion that speech of public concern
is of greater value than speech of private concern.49 Hence, in order to determine
42 See infra Part II.
43 See infra Part II.A-B.
44 See infra Part II.
45 See infra Part II.B.2.b, II.C.
4 See infra Part ll.C.
41 For a discussion of the standards of liability attached to public and private individuals,
refer to Part II.B. 1.
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.").
491 See generally Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)
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whether the media has the right to notify the public of the local presence of convicted
sex offenders, the analysis must focus on the First Amendment and the protective shield
it affords media entities when reporting on matters of public concern.5'
To begin with, the claim that sex offenders are a public concern is relatively un-
questioned.51 Arguably, then, it is equally unquestioned that the media's notification
of the presence of local sex offenders deserves First Amendment protection. The
problem with this contention, however, is that it potentially infringes upon the sex
offender's fundamental right to privacy.52 It is crucial to the validity of this argu-
ment that the ostensible tension that arises between the media's right to notification
and the individual's right to privacy is resolved in favor of the media. It is only
upon this conclusion that the media may legitimately expect, and ultimately receive,
First Amendment protection when publicly reporting on local sex offenders. A
detailed analysis of the factors that distinguish public and private speech is therefore
necessary.
The analysis must begin with an examination of those interests that have attained
legitimacy under the First Amendment. Included within this analysis is an extensive
investigation into the essential Supreme Court decisions that have defined specific
media rights when reporting on issues of public concern.53 This analysis must discern
how private facts become public knowledge if deemed newsworthy and essential to
the public debate.' Finally, the analysis will compare the media's right to report on
matters of public concern with the government's authority to enact sex offender notifi-
cation programs that publicize the presence of sex offenders in the community.55
Ultimately, it will become apparent that the media' s right to notification is supported
by the existing principles of current First Amendment jurisprudence.56
(finding that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance, and specifically
determining that false statements in a private credit report did not involve matters of public
concern).
SO See infra Part I.B.
"1 See, e.g., Daniel Merkle, Poll: Crime Worries Running High but Americans Don't Know
What to Do About It, ABCNews.com, June 4, 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Daily
News/crime-pollO10604.html (finding that 57% of all adults say worries about crime affect
the way they live); see also Saad, supra note 36 (finding that 94% of all Americans favor sex
offender registration laws and 66% think that it is likely a convicted sex offender lives in
their community).
52 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,483 (1965) (recognizing that "the
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intru-
sion"); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (stating that
fundamental rights include those liberties that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition").
" See infra Part I.B.
14 See infra Part I.B.
15 See infra Part I.C.
56 See infra Part I.D.
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A. The Legitimacy of the Media's Right to Report: The First Amendment and the
Public-Private Debate
As already noted, the media is generally protected from liability when reporting
on issues of public concern. 7 In light of this general rule, the question arises: how
does the law distinguish between matters of public and private concern for purposes
of the First Amendment? There are a variety of methods by which the two principles
are distinguished.
First, some scholars argue that deference must always be accorded to the media
because it is the most salient judge in determining what information is public.5
Although this argument has its merits, it is too biased toward the media's interests
because it grants the media almost unlimited authority in determining what it may
report in the interest of public knowledge. This scenario unfairly burdens the indi-
vidual's right to privacy by granting it tenuous protection from the constant intrusion
of an aggressive media.
A second, and more applicable, method to examine the difference between public
and private concern looks to the status of the individual whom the media seeks to
publicize.59 In emphasizing the status of the individual, this analysis forces an exami-
nation of the person's specific role in society to determine the public nature of his or
her actions. 60 This analysis is quite valid, but is more relevant to an examination of
the public versus private debate found within defamation law, and is not as relevant to
the analysis surrounding the First Amendment. 6' The status of the individual will be
examined extensively within the subsequent public figure argument62 but is not ap-
plied as broadly within this First Amendment analysis.
Instead, the proper test to resolve the tension between public and private concern
emphasizes the nature of the information involved within the specific debate.63 Inves-
tigating the nature of the information adheres to certain basic principles that courts
often use when determining the status of information upon which the media has a right
to report.' 4 The analysis focuses closely on the relationships in which the information
57 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
58 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 353-54 (1983) ("[D]eference to the
judgment of the press may actually be the appropriate and principled response to the news-
worthiness inquiry.").
'9 See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1008 (2003).
' See id.
61 Cf. id. at 1009 (arguing that focusing on the status of the individual is not conducive to
defining public versus private concern because there are instances where information about
private figures is of great public concern).
62 See infra Part H1.
63 See Solove, supra note 59, at 1010-13.
64 ,a
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is transferred and the uses to which this information is ultimately put.65 Consequently,
pertinent inquiries within this analysis address the means by which the media acquires
its information, the pervading results of the information's dissemination, and the
manner in which other entities have used similar information.'
In the context of the sex offender debate, such inquiries are useful because they
acknowledge both the means by which the media acquires information concerning
specific sex offenders and the subsequent purpose for releasing this information to the
greater public. This investigation is also substantially related to fundamental First
Amendment principles, which are generally expounded in the Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn67 line of cases that inquire into the types of information for which, upon report-
ing, the media may expect First Amendment protection. These cases adhere to the
principle that free speech contributes to the promotion of truth, and that greater public
disclosure yields more truth.68 Such a principle supports the proposition that the more
one knows about somebody or something, the more accurate one's judgment is when
assessing that person or thing.
B. Compelling Interests Within the First Amendment
Examination of the media's right to report on matters of public concern is guided
by those principles that determine whether speech is accorded protection under the
First Amendment. When faced with competing interests, most courts apply strict scru-
tiny to discern whether the potentially infringed upon individual right, which in the
case of sex offenders is the right to privacy, outweighs the competing right of the media
to report on matters of public concern.69 Constitutional challenges are rarely success-
ful in meeting these stringent demands, because in order for a competing interest to
outweigh a First Amendment free speech interest, the law must be the "least restric-
tive means" to achieve a "compelling" governmental interest.7 ° The focal point of
the current argument, therefore, is whether a sex offender's right to privacy is a
sufficiently compelling interest to dictate government regulation of the media's right
to report on their status as sex offenders.7 Consequently, to determine whether the
65 Id. at 1013-14 (focusing specifically on the nature of "one's relationships with other
people, social institutions, and the government").
6 Id.
67 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
68 See Solove, supra note 59, at 998 (expounding upon the notion of a "marketplace
of ideas").
69 See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). In the case of sex
offenders, the individual right at issue is the right to privacy.
70 Id. at 126. The concept of what constitutes a "compelling" governmental interest is
relatively undefined. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINcIPLEs AND
PoLIciEs 767 (2d ed. 2002).
"' Any constitutional challenges to state sex offender registration and notification statutes
are based on the notion that sex offenders possess a fundamental right to privacy concerning
2006]
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media's First Amendment right to report outweighs this privacy interest, a detailed
examination of the type of information that is generally protected under the First
Amendment is required.
This examination begins with the Supreme Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, which expounded upon the premise that the First Amendment prevents
liability for the public disclosure of private facts if the information was lawfully ob-
tained from public records and was truthfully reported.72 Specifically, the Court in Cox
did not impose liability upon a media outlet for publicizing the identity of a rape victim
whose name was acquired from public records that were maintained in connection
with a public trial and were open to public inspection.73
In reaching this decision, the Court acknowledged that in this particular situation
the individual's right to privacy was in direct confrontation with the media's right to
free speech.74 Further, the Court asserted that these competing interests were "plainly
rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society. '75 In balancing these
competing interests in favor of the media outlet, the Court acknowledged that in a
society where the general public relies heavily on the media as its primary source for
important information concerning the "operations of [the] government," the media
accepts a "[g]reat responsibility" to accurately report on such proceedings.76 Accord-
ingly, the Court determined that "[p]ublic records by their very nature are of interest
to those concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit is
performed" when reporting the contents of these records.77 Moreover, without access
to this vital information, citizens could not accurately judge the government's conduct,
thus diminishing the citizenry's role as the final arbiter of public business. 8 The
Court thus concluded that any rule allowing public records to remain available to the
media while simultaneously imposing liability for reporting on this information was
objectionable on the dual grounds that it hindered the public's ability to remain in-
formed about important public issues, and it invited "timidity and self-censorship"
to creep into a media hesitant to report on items of public concern in fear of incurring
future liability.79
The Cox decision established the principle that the First Amendment protects
the media from liability for truthfully reporting on matters available to the public in
official court records." In subsequent decisions the Supreme Court relied on Cox to
the specific controversy surrounding their sex offense. See infra Part I.C (analyzing the sex
offender's right to privacy).
72 420 U.S. at 491.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 489.
71 Id. at491.
76 Id. at 491-92.
77 Id. at 495.
78 id.
79 Id. at 496.
10 Id. at 496-97.
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find other areas in which the First Amendment prohibited media liability when report-
ing on issues of public concern.
For example, in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County District Court,8
the Court declared unconstitutional an Oklahoma state court's pretrial order enjoining
the media from publishing the name or photograph of an eleven-year-old boy in con-
nection with a juvenile proceeding that reporters had attended with the prior consent
of the presiding judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel.82 Similarly, in Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co.,83 the Court held that a West Virginia statute making it a crime
to publicize the name of a juvenile delinquent violated the First Amendment when the
reporting newspapers obtained the name of the alleged juvenile assailant from wit-
nesses, the police, and a local prosecutor.' These cases further established the prin-
ciple that state officials may not constitutionally punish media entities when reporting
on lawfully obtained, truthful information about matters of public concern, "absent a
need to further a state interest of the highest order."85
Subsequently, a cogent summation of the Cox line of decisions was expounded
in The Florida Star v. B.J.F.8 6 In Florida Star, the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional an attempt to hold a newspaper liable for identifying the name of a rape victim
inadvertently released in a police document.87 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
reinforced the important principle of modem First Amendment jurisprudence that,
absent a vital governmental interest of "the highest order," the media was entitled
to report on the truthful material it lawfully obtained.88 The Court cited as support-
ing factors concepts similar to those initially presented in Cox, Oklahoma Publishing,
and Daily Mail, including the facts that the disputed information was lawfully ob-
tained, was truthful in content, was already part of the public record, and that any
punishment extolled upon the media might lead to self-censorship.89
Particularly fatal to governmental regulation in Florida Star was the fact that the
government, itself, was the culpable party that provided the controversial material to
the media.' As a result, in a scenario where the government had "failed to police itself
in disseminating information," the imposition of liability against the media for subse-
quently reporting on the material was not a narrowly tailored means to protect the
affected individual's privacy. 9' Accordingly, when receiving information from a
81 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
82 Id. at 308-09.
83 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
8 Id. at 105-06.
85 Id. at 103.
86 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
87 Id. at 532.
88 Id. at 541.
89 Id. at 534-35.
90 Id. at 538.
91 Id.
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government-issued news release, the receiving party would understand that dissemi-
nation of the information was lawful, and even expected. 92
Having completed an inquiry into the general principles depicting the media's right
to free speech and its applicable First Amendment protection, 93 a corresponding ven-
ture into the jurisprudence pertaining specifically to the sex offender is necessary to
discern the privacy rights they possess as a class. After completing this particular anal-
ysis, it is possible to predict how the courts will balance the distinctive rights accorded
to sex offenders with those First Amendment rights generally granted to the media.
C. How "Compelling" Is the Sex Offender's Right to Privacy?
A phenomenon of the modem media age is that amid the zeal to report on news-
worthy matters, media outlets often pursue the same information that law enforcement
officials perceive as essential in their quest forjustice.94 Critics of this trend argue that
these collaborative efforts invite the use of "shaming" as a type of criminal punish-
ment.95 Additionally, there is the sense that when providing media outlets with desired
information concerning the status of prominent criminal investigations, law enforce-
ment officials in return expect the media to publicize the notoriety of these crimes,
placing public opinion squarely in favor of the law and potentially prejudicing future
legal proceedings.96
This argument is particularly relevant to sex offenders who argue that their
depiction within the media is an invasion of their privacy and unfairly stigmatizes
them as dangerous. The sentiment thus exists that media access to sex offenders'
records must be restricted to prevent the widespread dissemination of their notorious
status.97 This sentiment, however, is balanced against the general consensus that crime
92 Id. at 538-39.
9' For other Supreme Court decisions expounding upon the media's First Amendment
right to report on matters of public concern, see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)
(determining that First Amendment interest in publishing matters of public importance out-
weighed individuals' privacy rights to conversation intercepted illegally, when the media outlet
played no part in the illegal act); Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (extending First
Amendment protection to the revelation of information from grandjury proceedings); Landmark
Commc'ns Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (refusing to permit criminal sanctions against
a media outlet for reporting information from confidential judicial disciplinary proceedings
leaked to them).
9' See Rodney A. Smolla, Privacy and the FirstAmendment Right to Gather News, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1097, 1099 (1999) (arguing that "there is a growing sense that the media and
the law enforcement are often in cahoots").
9' See id. at 1099-100.
96 See id. at 1132.
9 See generally Catherine A. Trinkle, Note, Federal Standards for Sex Offender Regis-
tration: Public Disclosure Confronts the Right to Privacy, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 299,
334-35 (1995) (arguing that sex offender registration programs should refrain from unwar-
ranted intrusion upon a sex offender's right to privacy and thus should be limited to those
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reporting is within the legitimate province of the media and thus is generally accorded
First Amendment protection.98 It is apparent, then, that the tension that exists
between the individual's right to privacy and the media's right to report extends to
circumstances in which the private individual is a criminal. As a result, the preced-
ing analysis of those important Supreme Court decisions that attempt to resolve the
First Amendment tension between public concern and the right to privacy is also appli-
cable within a criminal context. Nonetheless, to resolve this tension equitably in the
case of the previously convicted sex offender, it is important to discern how courts
depict their specific right to privacy. In general, courts are confronted with this issue
within the context of constitutional challenges to the applicable sex offender notifi-
cation statutes.' This is where the current inquiry must proceed, then, in order to effec-
tively determine whether the media has the right to notification when dealing with
local sex offenders.
1. Constitutional Challenges to Sex Offender Notification Statutes
In general, individuals affected by sex offender notification laws have challenged
the relevant statutes on two main grounds: either the statutes constitute punishment
and therefore violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, or the statutes are an invasion of their
right to privacy and thus violate a fundamental liberty interest.'"° Relevant to the
inquiry at hand are those decisions that expound upon the potential privacy rights that
are infringed upon in the name of community protection."l ' The majority of these
challenges also include claims alleging violations of the sex offender's right to due
process, and thus the right to privacy is often intertwined with the larger question of
whether sex offender notification laws violate substantive or procedural due process.'02
At first glance, it appears that the majority of courts presiding over issues per-
taining to a sex offender's right to privacy have determined that the disputed laws do
not violate any privacy rights. 3 Generally, the reviewing courts have concluded that
periods in which the convicted offender actually poses a threat to the community at large).
98 See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971) (outlining the stan-
dards by which courts balance First Amendment protections with individual privacy rights
in a criminal context).
99 See SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 1, at 51 (noting that if sex offenders pos-
sess a constitutional right to privacy in the dissemination of their criminal records, it must
be limited by balancing the public's right to be informed with the sex offender's right to
remain anonymous).
'0o See id. at 50-51.
10' For a Supreme Court decision examining the alleged punitive nature of sex offender
registration and notification laws, see Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (denying a convicted
sex offender's § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of Alaska's Sex Offender
Registration Act as a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause).
'02 See SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 1, at 51-52.
103 See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
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the information contained in community notification, which includes the sex offender's
conviction, residence, place of business or school, and driver's license number, is
already part of the public record, and thus dissemination of such information is not
revealing of intimate personal details traditionally protected from disclosure by the
federal right to privacy.' ° Consequently, any right to privacy possessed by a convicted
sex offender regarding this information is not a compelling enough interest to outweigh
the government's own compelling interest in protecting the public. 5
Not all courts, however, have followed this line of reasoning when analyzing sex
offenders' privacy rights. In fact, some courts have found that community notification
does implicate a protected liberty interest."° These courts have determined that notifi-
cation brands previously convicted sex offenders as threats to the community, and thus
registration places a "tangible burden" on them, potentially damaging their legal status
"for the rest of their lives."'" Because the sex offender's reputation is at stake, these
courts have determined that notification statutes implicate sufficient constitutional
interests to affect state due process rights."'0 Typically, these courts attempt to protect
the sex offender's right to due process by providing that individual with a right to a
hearing in order to assess the risk he or she poses to the community at large."° Only
if the specific sex offender poses a serious enough risk do these courts determine that
the public's right to notification outweighs the ensuing deprivation of the affected sex
offender's right to privacy." °
These decisions constitute a reconsideration of the relevant balancing factors and
thus place a greater emphasis on the sex offender's right to privacy as compared to
the public's right to notification. This reassessment of the balancing factors seems
to weaken the argument proposed within this analysis, i.e., that the media has a right
to community notification. The reconsideration is diminished, however, upon inspec-
tion of the Supreme Court's subsequent analysis of the tension between notification
and privacy in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe."'
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety, the Court determined that
Connecticut's sex offender notification statute did not violate procedural due process
because it failed to provide sex offenders with the right to a hearing before releasing
the required information to the public.' 2 Vital to this conclusion was the fact that
Connecticut based its registry requirements on the previous conviction, and not the
1007 (1998); Paul P. v. Verniero, 982 F. Supp. 961 (D.N.J. 1997); Rowe v. Burton, 884 F.
Supp. 1372 (D. Alaska 1994); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
" ' See Paul P., 982 F. Supp. at 966; Rowe, 884 F. Supp. at 1384; Poritz, 662 A.2d at 407.
0'5 Poritz, 662 A.2d at 411-12.
'o See Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Poritz, 662 A.2d at 420-21.
107 Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468.
'0' Poritz, 662 A.2d at 420.
109 Id. at 421.
110 Id.
" 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
... See id. at7.
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sex offender's current dangerousness." 3 Consequently, a constitutional challenge
alleging a violation of procedural due process was misguided, because it was not mate-
rial to the application of Connecticut's statute." 4 The statute's requirements stressed
that the sex offender had already received a constitutionally guaranteed right to a
hearing during trial, and for that reason the question of whether the sex offender still
posed a threat to the community was immaterial to the resolution of a procedural due
process challenge, and the Court's decision sanctioned this reasoning." 5
D. Combining Theories: The First Amendment and Community Notification
In Connecticut Department of Public Safety, the Supreme Court upheld Connecti-
cut's sex offender registration scheme by focusing on the sex offender's prior con-
viction as compared to their current mental status." 6 A question left unresolved,
however, was whether the statute could also withstand a challenge on substantive
due process grounds." 7 Since the challenge was presented on procedural due process
grounds only, the Court deemed it unnecessary to address that question directly."
18
It is arguable, however, that the Court's assertion that "'sex offenders are a serious
threat in this Nation"' suggested that Connecticut's statute would withstand a constitu-
tional challenge on substantive grounds also." 9
A substantive due process challenge invokes the deeper question of whether injury
to reputation alone is sufficient to establish a liberty interest compelling enough to
outweigh the government's interest in public protection. 2 ° It is this question, ulti-
mately, that is central to the resolution of the second main inquiry of this Note, i.e.,
whether sex offenders are public figures and thus subject to an infringement of their
right to privacy that is injurious to their personal reputations.'2 '
"I Id. at 4.
"l Id. at 7.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 4.
17 See id.
"' Id. at 8 (asking whether the respondent's claim was actually a substantive due process
claim "recast in 'procedural due process' terms" (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 308
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
".. Id. at 4 (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24,32 (2002)). For a recent decision in which
a federal court rejected a substantive due process challenge to a sex offender registration
program, see In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431,447-51 (D.C. 2004) (determining that sex offender
registration does not infringe upon any fundamental liberty interests possessed by affected
sex offenders). See also SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES, supra note 1, at 53 (noting that courts are
more likely to uphold community notification statutes that rely on public safety and attempt
to relate community notification to the public benefit).
20 For a Supreme Court decision casting doubt on whether injury to reputation constitutes
a deprivation of a viable liberty interest, see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
12 See infra Part II.
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For purposes of the First Amendment argument, however, the Supreme Court's
denial of the constitutional challenge to Connecticut's sex offender notification statute
is significant because it rejects the notion that the lack of a subsequent hearing prior
to the public release of the convicted sex offender's information is a violation of pro-
cedural due process.'22 When this principle is combined with the general tenet that
a sex offender's right to privacy is outweighed by the governmental interest in com-
munity protection, it is reasonable to infer that the public has the right to notification
of a sex offender's presence in their community.
Moreover, the prior analysis profiling the media' s First Amendment right to report
on matters of public concern suggests that public notification of pertinent sex offender
data is the type of information that media outlets may publicly report with the expec-
tation of First Amendment protection.' Ultimately, such principles merge into a
single theory that makes the following assertion plausible: in order to satisfy the com-
pelling governmental interest in notifying the public of the presence of convicted sex
offenders in their communities, the government may enlist the aid of media outlets
to help disseminate such vital information, because it is the media's right under the First
Amendment to report on matters of public concern, including the local presence of
convicted sex offenders.
If further proof is needed to ascertain whether sex offenders are a viable public
concern deserving of an application of the First Amendment's free speech protection,
it may be helpful to ask this question: would Jacob Wetterling be sitting at home
with his family now if the public was informed of the local presence of convicted
sex offenders prior to his abduction?
]1. THE PUBLIC FIGURE
The preceding analysis focused primarily on the question of whether the media
is protected by the First Amendment when reporting on matters of public concern.
Specifically, the inquiry focused on the nature of the information reported and its sig-
nificance within the public forum. 24 In particular, if this information was deemed
vital to the public interest, the First Amendment provided the media with a protective
shield under which it could report with widespread immunity. 25 Consequently, First
Amendment protection was properly accorded to the media upon determining that
the local presence of sex offenders in the community was a public concern. 26
The second part of the current inquiry focuses less on the media's right to report
and more on the sex offender's position in society. The fundamental question to be
answered in this analysis is whether sex offenders are public figures due to the contro-
versy that surrounds their crimes and thus are subject to the inevitable media scrutiny
122 Conn. Dep't of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at 4.
123 See supra Part I.B.
124 See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
125 See supra Part I.B.
126 See supra Part I.C-D.
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that undoubtedly will result. Such an inquiry is entrenched within those principles
of defamation law that outline the specific standards of liability applied to media
entities when reporting on particular individuals within society.127
The hurdle to proving liability for defamation is much higher for public figures
than for their private counterparts. 12' Accordingly, if an examination of the public
figure doctrine supports a conclusion that sex offenders are public figures, media orga-
nizations gain added protection when reporting on their presence to the public; an out-
come that is equivalent to that which is secured in a First Amendment analysis. 29
Such a conclusion would support the principal notion that the First Amendment pro-
tects the media's right to report on matters of public concern, namely, the presence
of local sex offenders.
Nonetheless, while acknowledging that this inquiry will attempt to sustain those
principles vital to the First Amendment, this argument will proceed in a manner that
is quite unique. Rather than attempting to argue that sex offenders are public figures
and thus subject to public investigation into their sexual and criminal histories, this
argument will instead prove that sex crimes are public acts, and that those persons who
commit such crimes warrant public figure status as a result.'3" The sex offender's status
is accordingly defined by the consequences of their actions.
As a result, the following inquiry into the public figure doctrine will proceed in
the same manner as that of the previous First Amendment analysis. The difference in
the investigations will ultimately lie in the bodies of law that are controlling, namely,
defamation jurisprudence instead of First Amendment jurisprudence. This difference
will change the type of data assimilated, focusing on the individual's status in society
instead of the nature of the information that is reported."' The conclusion of each
inquiry, however, will remain the same: the media has the right to report on local
sex offenders because sex offenses are a public concern, and as a consequence, the
persons who commit such crimes are public figures.
A. Defamation Jurisprudence: The Public-Private Tension Revisited
Before initiating an extensive analysis of the public figure doctrine and its potential
implications on the sex offender notification debate, it is first necessary to return to
an issue raised at the end of the preceding First Amendment analysis. As noted in the
examination of the Supreme Court's decision in Connecticut Department of Public
Safety, the Court did not investigate the issue of whether Connecticut's sex offender
notification statute violated substantive due process because the respondent's claim
alleged only a violation of procedural due process. 32 If the Court had presided over
2 See infra Part II.B.1-2.
121 See infra Part II.B.1.
129 For a of these First Amendment rights, see supra Part I.A.
130 For a of the public nature of sex crimes, see infra Part II.B.2.a-b.
"' See infra Part II.B-C.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
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a substantive due process challenge, however, the examination would have rested
on the question of whether injury to an individual's personal reputation was a com-
pelling enough liberty interest to outweigh the government's competing interest in
public protection.'a
A substantive due process challenge, therefore, presents a similar tension involving
the right to privacy and the public's right to notification as that which forms the basis
of the public-private tension in the First Amendment analysis. " Consequently, courts
must rely on those principles vital to the Supreme Court's decisions in the preceding
First Amendment cases when rendering decisions in substantive due process challenges
to media reports on the presence of local sex offenders.'35
Hence, the existence of this tension between public information and an individual's
right to privacy also is essential to the successful resolution of disputes within defa-
mation law. "6 Specifically, protection is provided for media entities in defamation
actions in order to uphold the First Amendment's "vital guarantee of [a] free and un-
inhibited discussion of public issues.""' This is the same guarantee that compelled the
Supreme Court to rule favorably on the media's behalf when deciding whether they
could legitimately publicize information that pertained to matters of public con-
cem. "8 On the other hand, courts in defamation actions must also recognize society's
"pervasive and strong interestin preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation." 39
The prevention of public injury to personal reputation, therefore, is a core value that
is considered when judging the media's conduct in distributing information.140
In light of this core value, analyzing a sex offender's public status in the context of
defamation law is important because a defamation claim is the most common avenue
by which sex offenders seek to redress personal attacks upon their reputation."' If it
13' See supra Part I.C. 1, I.D.
'" The success of the substantive due process challenge again rests on the issue of whether
the right to privacy is a fundamental right, sufficient to outweigh the corresponding compelling
governmental interest in public protection by way of public notification. See supra Part I.A,
I.C.1.
5 Those cases are Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn and its progeny, discussed supra Part I.B.
136 See generally Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84-88 (1966) (discussing the extent to
which the First Amendment's adherence to upholding public speech must be balanced with
society's competing interest in protecting personal reputations).
' Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990).
138 See supra Part I.B.
139 Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86. Justice Stewart eloquently depicted society's interest in protect-
ing personal reputations in his concurrence in Rosenblatt, stating that "[t]he right of a man to
the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more
than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept
at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." Id. at 92-93 (Stewart, J., concurring).
'40 Id. at 86.
41 See Miani Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (deter-
mining that the defamation action plays an important role in society by representing an indi-
vidual's sole remedy against the occasional excesses of the media, which has in comparison
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is proven that defamation law does not provide a safe haven in which sex offenders
may shelter their public reputations, then the media has achieved a decisive victory in
its goal to notify the public of their presence in the community. Such a victory is ob-
tainable upon a finding that convicted sex offenders are public figures, and thus are
accorded diminished personal reputation protection because of this position within
society. 42 The remainder of this argument will therefore focus on defamation law and,
specifically, the public figure doctrine, and will ultimately demonstrate that convicted
sex offenders are accurately defined as public figures.
B. The Public Figure Defined: The Doctrinal Foundation of the Public
Figure Status
At the outset of this analysis it is important to note that there is no bright-line
standard with which to define the public figure.4 3 Consequently, the public figure
remains an elusive and often amorphous character within the law. This reality makes
the sex offender a viable candidate for the status because the public figure has been
interpreted broadly by a variety of jurisdictions, and thus there is ample space in which
to insert the sex offender within the definition.'" Indeed, an analysis of decisions clas-
sifying certain individuals as public figures, especially within the criminal context, com-
pels it as preferable that sex offenders are regarded as public figures. 4 ' Ultimately,
the importance of determining whether sex offenders are public figures does not arise
from the label itself, but instead arises from the standard of liability that is attached
to this class of individuals.'" Concluding that convicted sex offenders are public
figures in effect immunizes and, subsequently, emboldens the media in reporting on sex
offenders in the community, which enhances the ultimate goal of sex offender notifi-
cation statutes: public protection and safety.
To make this determination an initial discussion will focus on the historical back-
ground of the public figure, and the corresponding development of the standards of
liability attached to each class of media subjects.'47 Then the discussion will delve into
an analysis of key concepts in the public figure equation, namely, the public controversy
and the manner in which individuals enter into these controversies.'" Finally, in order
to demonstrate the means by which sex offenders become embroiled in viable public
controversies, an analysis of relevant case law involving similar fact patterns will com-
mence, and will ultimately support the conclusion that sex offenders are public figures. 49
vast resources to inflict damage to an individual's reputation).
142 See infra Part II.B.1.
"' See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 1049-52.
'44 See infra Part II.B.2.
141 See infra Part II.B.2.a.
146 See infra text accompanying notes 163-68.
147 See infra Part II.B. 1.
141 See infra Part II.B.2.a-b.
m49 See infra Part II.B.2.b, II.C.
2006]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
1. The Development of the Public Figure Doctrine and Its Applicable Standards
of Liability
The origins of the public figure doctrine are commonly attributed to the influential
1964 Supreme Court decision of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'50 In New York
Times the Court held that a public official plaintiff could recover for defamation only
upon proving with "convincing clarity" that the allegedly defamatory statements were
made with "actual malice."'' The Court defined actual malice as evidence that the
defendant knew his or her statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of the truth
when issuing the statement. 52 By requiring that public official plaintiffs prove actual
malice in order to recover for defamation, the Court established an exceptionally high
barrier to recovery that essentially made media entities liability-proof when reporting
on public officials. Accordingly, New York Times's importance rested in its appli-
cation of the First Amendment as a limitation on tort liability, especially when per-
taining to speech of political importance.' 53 Moreover, this decision validated the
importance of a free and uninhibited public debate vital to the notion of a marketplace
of ideas often regarded as the epitome of a robust democracy."
In 1967 the Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard to individuals
classified as public figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.55 In Butts, the Court
determined that a "public figure" who was not a public official could recover damages
for a defamatory falsehood only upon showing that the media defendant in question
had published its statements with actual malice.'56 In reaching this decision the Court
acknowledged that not all speech of public interest concerned public officials and thus
public speech must include information that was necessary for the public "'to cope
with the exigencies of their period." 57
Hence, the Butts Court concluded that within the public debate there was no logic
behind a regime that differentiated between a public official and a public figure.'58
150 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
'I' ld. at 285-86.
152 Id. at 279-80.
"' See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 70, at 1044-45.
14 As Justice Brennan stated, writing for the Court, allowing tort liability to exist for speech
containing criticisms of government officials would undermine "a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,
and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials," and further would deny speech the "breathing space" it needs
to survive. N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270-71.
"' 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (defining public figures as those persons who achieved prominence
in their communities).
156 Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
'5' Id. at 147 (majority opinion) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 (1940)).
'ss Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring) ("[D]ifferentiation between 'public figures' and
'public officials' and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law,
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Four years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., the Court extended the Butts
analysis even further by expanding the actual malice standard to all defamatory state-
ments of public concern, irrespective of the plaintiff s status.5 9 The Court determined
that the public's interest in the protection of a free and open public forum was of such
importance that the status of the individual in question, whether public or private,
was essentially inconsequential in comparison to the media's right to free speech.'60
As a result, by 1974, a mere ten years after the landmark New York Times decision
reshaped the landscape of defamation jurisprudence, distinctions between public
officials, public figures, and private individuals had become obsolete. Instead, a proper
inquiry focused solely on the public interest in the material reported.' 6 1 In Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., however, the Supreme Court reassessed the public figure status
as a means for determining defamation liability, and in the process provided a more
complex spectrum in which to scrutinize the media's right to free speech concerning
individuals embroiled within public controversies. 62
At the center of the dispute in Gertz was the issue of whether a private individual
could recover damages from a media entity for the publication or broadcast of a defam-
atory statement. 63 In answering this question affirmatively, the Court recognized that
the legitimate state interest in protecting the reputation of private individuals required
a different standard of liability than that which was attached to public individuals.'64
Consequently, the Gertz Court overruled its previous decision in Rosenbloom and held
that, in regards to defamatory statements issued against private individuals, states could
determine for themselves the applicable standard of liability, so long as they did not
impose no-fault liability.' 65
The Court based its ruling on two fundamental principles differentiating public
and private individuals. First, the Court determined that public figures had greater
access to "channels of effective communication" than did private individuals, and thus
could effectively rebut defamatory statements made against their character."6 Second,
public figures generally had chosen to enter the public spotlight voluntarily, and thus
exposed themselves to the increased risk of incurring reputational injury from defam-
atory statements. 67
logic, or First Amendment policy.").
'19 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
"6 Id. at 43 ("If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual
did not 'voluntarily' choose to become involved.").
161 See id. at 45-49.
162 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
163 Id. at 332.
'64 See id. at 342-43.
165 Id. at 347.
'66 Id. at 344.
167 See id. at 344-45.
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In the end, the Gertz holding lowered the applicable standard of liability that
private individual plaintiffs must prove before recovering damages in a defamation
lawsuit. Hence, the true importance of the Gertz decision was the implementation of
a negligence standard upon which private figure individuals could recover for defama-
tory falsehoods made by media entities."' Unfortunately, the Gertz Court did not
provide a clear definition of the public figure. As a result, defamation plaintiffs enjoy
wide latitude to argue that they are private individuals and thus deserving of the appli-
cable lesser burden to establishing liability.
2. The Public Figure's Relevant Legal Tests
While the Gertz Court did not provide a concise definition of the public figure, the
Court did hint at certain features fundamental to the public figure. 69 Specifically, the
Court provided two alternative foundations upon which to support public figure status.
First, individuals could achieve such "persuasive power and influence" that they "are
deemed public figures for all purposes."' 17 More commonly, individuals could be-
come public figures by voluntarily "thrust[ing] themselves to the forefront of a par-
ticular public controversy" and thus becoming a public figure for purposes of the
specific controversy in question.' The Court also acknowledged that it was possible
that an individual could become a public figure "through no purposeful action of his
own."' 72 Such circumstances were considered rare, and thus most individuals became
public figures by assuming "roles of special prominence in the affairs of society."'73
In addition, the general all-purpose public figure was also said to be rare, and thus
absent clear evidence that an individual had achieved general fame and notoriety
in society, individuals were not to be considered public figures for all facets of their
lives. 74 Instead, the inquiry favored by the Court was an examination into the "nature
and extent of [the] individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to
the defamation."' 75 Based on this preference, the Gertz Court established the limited-
purpose public figure as the dominant character within defamation jurisprudence.
Although no subsequent Supreme Court decision has formulated a precise
definition of the public figure, the Gertz Court did indicate that to achieve public
figure status an individual generally had to voluntarily thrust himself into the public
spotlight.'76 Accordingly, most courts interpreting the Gertz standard typically focus
168 See supra text accompanying notes 159-65.





174 Id. at 352.
175 Id.
176 For examples of individuals voluntarily thrusting themselves into the public spotlight,
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on two important concepts when determining whether the plaintiff in question is a
public or private figure. 1" First, reviewing courts must decide whether the controversy
in which the individual is involved is sufficient to constitute a real public controversy
7 8
Second, these courts must determine whether the plaintiff's subsequent involvement
in the controversy is sufficient to achieve public prominence. 179
Hence, to determine whether a convicted sex offender is the type of individual
correctly accorded public figure status, an analysis of these concepts is required.
a. The Public Controversy
When attempting to define a public controversy it is proper to question whether
this concept is actually an equitable articulation of the aforementioned public con-
cern theory. 0 There are scholars that would argue the veracity of such a premise,
citing as evidence the relative compatibility of the two concepts.' The problem with
this assertion, however, stems from the existence of legal doctrine that mandates that
a public controversy is a prerequisite to the existence of a legal public figure.8 2
see generally Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (ruling that a research scientist
who received a derogatory award from a public official was not a public figure because he
had not assumed any role of public prominence); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S.
157 (1979) (finding that an individual was a private figure even though he had been con-
victed of contempt for his refusal to appear before a grand jury investigating espionage by
the Soviet Union); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (determining that a plaintiff's
divorce, though a "cause celebre," was not sufficient to make her a public figure in a consti-
tutional sense).
177 See, e.g., Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-98 (D.C. Cir.
1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). Waldbaum established an effective three-prong test,
a version of which is generally accepted in most jurisdictions, to determine whether defama-
tion plaintiffs are limited purpose public figures. Id. The three factors include: (1) isolating
the pertinent public controversy; (2) ascertaining the extent of the plaintiff's role in that contro-
versy; and (3) determining whether the alleged defamation was germane to the plaintiffs
participation in that controversy. Id. For the purposes of this argument, the second and third
prongs of the Waldbaum test are combined.
"' Id. at 1296.
179 Id. at 1297.
'80 For a discussion of the public concern concept, see supra Part I.A.
181 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 880-81 (2d ed. 1988)
(noting that the test for determining public figure status requires judges "to determine whether
a controversy is 'public,' a determination indistinguishable ... from whether the subject matter
is of public or general concern"). But see Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 (stating that public
controversies are not equatable to all matters of public interest); Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296
(noting that public controversies are not merely matters of public interest, but are real
disputes that affect the public in tangible ways).
182 See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 453 (failing to find plaintiff a public figure without involve-
ment in a particular public controversy); see also Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d
1541, 1553 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the controversy must exist "prior to the publication
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Consequently, the declaration that sex offenders, because of their categorization as
matters of public concern, are genuine participants in a legitimate public controversy
is not as straightforward as it may initially seem.
Generally, public controversies must involve matters of significant importance to
the public, rather than matters that simply pique the public's interest. 83 As a result,
private disputes do not become public controversies simply because they attract
public attention. " Instead, the public controversy is a dispute that has received public
attention because its ramifications are felt by persons who are not direct participants."
Accordingly, public controversies exist in situations that affect the public health and
safety, involve significant public policy issues, or concern fundamental community
values.18 6 Public controversies are not created by the media's willingness to report on
issues that it considers newsworthy, but instead are a product of the public debate and
give rise to potential ramifications that affect the public at large. 8 7
Society, therefore, sets the agenda as to what constitutes significant public contro-
versies, and both the courts and the media must act accordingly. It is evident, then, that
any dispute substantial enough to affect non-participants is sufficient to warrant public
concern. 88 It is also evident that public controversies must constitute significant
debates within the public forum, and thus will touch upon serious issues relating to
community values, civic activities, or public safety. 8 9
Based on the public uproar surrounding the presence of undetected sex offenders
in the community and the subsequent legislative response attempting to rectify this
crisis, it is hardly a stretch to classify convicted sex offenders as a legitimate public
controversy."9 Tragedies like that which befell Jacob Wetterling incite public senti-
ment against the perpetrators of sex crimes, while simultaneously solidifying public
resolve in support of sex offender notification programs.'9 ' Indeed, the multitude of
of the defamatory statement"); Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296 (determining that courts must
initially find a public controversy before determining whether a plaintiff is a public figure).
For an analysis of how courts adhere to a separate inquiry into the existence of a public contro-
versy before examining the plaintiffs ensuing role within that controversy, see Nat Stem,
Unresolved Antitheses of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 Hous. L. REv. 1027,
1040-47 (1996).
's See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296.
,8 See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454-55.
15 See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1296.
16 See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118
(2000). For other cases involving public controversies, see Dameron v. Washington Magazine,
Inc., 779 F.2d 736, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (human tragedy), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141
(1986); Foretich v. Advance Magazine Publishers, 765 F. Supp. 1099, 1107 (D.D.C. 1991)
(public policy); ELM Med. Lab. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 675,680 (Mass. 1989) (public
health).
187 See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.
188 See id.
189 See supra text accompanying note 186.
'~ See supra Introduction, Part A.
'9' For a discussion of how the community reacted to Jacob's disappearance, see supra text
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constitutional questions raised by the advent of stringent sex offender registration
and notification programs confirms the existence of an ongoing public debate within
society that serves to keep the public status of sex offenders at the forefront of the
nation's consciousness.'92
A finding that the presence of sex offenders in the community is a legitimate public
controversy, however, does not settle the debate over whether sex offenders are viable
public figures. Courts may acknowledge a public controversy's existence but subse-
quently determine that the plaintiffs involvement in the controversy is not sufficient
to warrant public figure status. 93 Accordingly, the second part of the public figure
analysis will focus on the plaintiff's role in the public controversy, and specifically will
focus on whether his or her involvement in this controversy is voluntary and thus
adequately substantial to merit public figure status and its appropriate standard of
liability. ' Proving the voluntary nature of the sex offender's involvement within
the relevant public controversy is particularly difficult, and will ultimately rest on the
determination of whether sex offenders reside in that elusive class of individuals known
as involuntary public figures. 95
b. The Plaintiff's Involvement in the Public Controversy
Upon determining that the controversy in question is public, the second deter-
minant of public figure status involves defining the plaintiff's role within that con-
troversy. 1" If this role is trivial, the plaintiff is regarded as a private individual.'97 As
initially expounded in Gertz, public figures must "thrust themselves to the forefront"
of a public controversy so as to become integral to its ultimate resolution.' 98 Public
figure plaintiffs, therefore, must intentionally try to affect the outcome of the contro-
versy or must realistically expect, because of their position within the controversy, to
have an impact on its resolution. 9 Subsequently, a reviewing court may look "to the
plaintiff's past conduct, the extent of [the media's] coverage, and the public['s] reaction
to the [plaintiffs] conduct," as viable factors in determining the public or private status
of the libel plaintiff in question.2 '
There also exists a phenomenon in which the plaintiffs aggressive conduct within
a specific controversy may persuade a court to find that the controversy is public even
accompanying notes 9-13.
192 See supra Part I.C-D.
'93 See Stem, supra note 182, at 1046.
See supra Part II.B.2.b.
'9' See supra Part II.C.
'99 See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
197 See id.
198 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
' See Waldbaum, 627 F.2d at 1297.
200 See id.
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if that controversy is not considered public under a classic definition.2"' Conversely,
controversies of "unusual magnitude or with close connection to the core concerns
of the First Amendment" may diminish the extent to which the plaintiff's conduct
is vital to a public figure assessment. 2 Consequently, there is some flexibility in
which courts may tweak the formal standards applicable to the public controversy
in order to uphold the best interests of the community.
Because it is apparent that sex offender notification programs constitute signifi-
cant public controversies, this flexibility of standards becomes extremely important
in clarifying whether the active participation of sex offenders within this specific de-
bate is sufficient to merit public figure status. When resolving whether sex offenders
demonstrate that active standard of participation required to attain public figure status,
it is important to note that significant public controversies require lower thresholds
of involvement in order to satisfy these participation requirements.2 3
Correspondingly, the controversy's importance is derived from its connection to
significant public issues that are fundamental to the First Amendment's protection of
free speech.2 4 Those individuals whose conduct falls under the scope of the First
Amendment's interest in protecting speech involving matters of public concern may
not have to exhibit a high level of voluntary participation to attain public figure status
for the purposes of the controversy in question. On the contrary, plaintiffs who engage
in conduct that is likely to invite public attention, and initiate the public debate as a
result, may position themselves to attain public figure status.2 5 Furthermore, the
plaintiff' s aversion to public attention is not a persuasive factor in determining the indi-
vidual's public status.' It appears, then, that a principal qualification possessed by
most public figures is the public perception that they are involved in a significant public
controversy, an inquiry that effectively replaces a focus on their active participation
within the controversy.
The validity of this statement is illustrated by an examination of the public figure
status of convicted criminals whose state of affairs are relatively similar to that ex-
perienced by convicted sex offenders. In general, individuals who choose to engage
in criminal activity effectively expose their reputations to injury.2" In addition, crimes
21 See Stern, supra note 182, at 1048 (stating that a court can "tailor its description of the
relevant dispute to assure that plaintiffs have thrust themselves into it").
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1053 (citing Mlichael A. Bamberger, Public Figures and the Law ofLibel: A Concept
in Search of a Definition, 33 BUS. LAw. 709, 719 (1978)).
204 See id. at 1054 ('The notion that speech on public issues stands at the apex of a hierarchy
of expression has a long jurisprudential pedigree."); see also supra Part I.A-C.
205 See Brueggemeyer v. Am. Broad. Co., 684 F. Supp. 452, 458 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
206 See McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942,949 (3d Cir. 1985) (undertaking "a course
of conduct that invites attention," regardless of express intent, may confer "[p]ublic figure
status"); Bandelin v. Pietsch, 563 P.2d 395,398 (Idaho 1977) (noting that "[plublic figure status
does not hinge upon an individual's preference in the matter[,]" even if that preference is to
remain anonymous), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977).
207 See, e.g., Ali v. Daily News Publ'g. Co., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 142 (D.D.C. 1982) (finding
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where public figures are the victims, or that are of a particularly heinous nature, are
also public controversies, and thus become matters of great concern to the public.208
Accordingly, criminal activity that has warranted public figure status includes
murder,2 9 organized crime, 210 and drug trafficking."'
Comparing sex offense crimes with the aforementioned felonies presents favorable
similarities, especially when considered in conjunction with the great disdain with
which the public views sex offenders.1 2 Even though criminal activity by itself does
not create public figure status, it is a convincing factor that often leads courts to deter-
mine that law-breaking individuals are public figures.2 3 It is a compelling argument
that criminal defendants assume the risk of personal attacks to their reputations by
choosing a life of crime. Moreover, regardless of whether criminals enter into a path
of misconduct with this risk in mind, the significant interest in public protection
demands public disclosure.2"4
C. An Assumed Risk: Sex Offenders as Involuntary Public Figures
The preceding analysis of the public controversy and active participant concepts
is critical in defining the public figure.21 5 Moreover, the examination of the public
figure status of criminal defendants provides an important corollary to support the
premise that sex offenders are public figures.216 The concept that individuals who
engage in criminal activities assume the risk of publicity provides the foundation for
the final argument of this section, which is that sex offenders are an example of that
rare class of persons who have involuntarily become public figures. This argument's
validity rests on its ability to negate the contradictory claim that sex offenders are not
public figures because they lack the voluntary impetus to thrust themselves to the fore-
front of a public controversy.1 7 Hence, an investigation into the validity of the
that a prisoner convicted of murder was a public figure); Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F.
Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978) (determining that plaintiff became a public figure by attempting to
become a hit man); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992) (noting
that in some circumstances a plaintiff may become a public figure by committing a crime).
208 See Ruebke v. Globe Commc'ns Corp., 738 P.2d 1246 (Kan. 1987).
209 See Ali, 540 F. Supp. at 145; Logan, 447 F. Supp. at 1331; Ruebke, 738 P.2d at 1252.
210 See Rosanova v. Playboy Enter. Inc., 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
211 See Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1985).
212 For a discussion why sex offenders acquire public contempt, see supra Introduction.
213 See Marcone, 754 F.2d at 1085.
214 See Scottsdale Publ'g, Inc. v. Superior Court, 764 P.2d 1131, 1140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988)
(noting that criminal defendants assume the risk of "unflattering limelight" by "choosing a life
of crime").
215 See supra Part II.B.2.a-b.
216 See supra Part II.B.2.b.
217 For a decision presenting a successful argument that individuals accused of committing
sex crimes are not public figures, see Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541 (4th
Cir. 1994).
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involuntary public figure status itself provides the appropriate scheme in which to
represent the convicted sex offender's dubious place within society.
The involuntary public figure inquiry must begin with the Gertz Court's famous
statement that involuntary public figures are "exceedingly rare."2 ' Abiding by the
notion that involuntary public figures are scarce requires that this doctrine be strictly
applied to those controversies that implicate serious threats to the public health and
safety.2 9 Accordingly, the key factor in the formation of the involuntary public figure
is the course of conduct that inserts the individual into a significant public contro-
versy.22° Involuntary public figures do not voluntarily seek public attention; instead,
they assume the risk of publicity by pursuing a course of conduct from which "it [is]
reasonably foreseeable, at the time of the conduct, that public interest [will] arise. 221
The foundation of the involuntary public figure doctrine, therefore, rests on the notion
that the individual in question "has taken some action, or failed to act when action was
required, in circumstances in which a reasonable person would understand that pub-
licity would likely inhere. '' 2 Hence, if an individual acts in a manner which will fore-
seeably inject them into a significant public controversy, then it is equally foreseeable
that public scrutiny will arise from such conduct. It is not surprising, therefore, when
media coverage ensues to further inform the public.
Based on these factors, the plight of the sex offender provides a favorable setting
in which to apply the involuntary public figure doctrine. The position of convicted sex
offenders in society is the fulcrum of a significant public debate that touches upon
issues of extreme public importance, including public health and safety.23 Moreover,
the existence of highly publicized, and controversial, sex offender registration and
notification programs legitimizes the currency and ultimately the permanence of this
debate.224 If sex offenders wish to avoid the burden of the public figure label, they
must successfully argue that despite their crimes they have not assumed any risk of
ongoing public attention.225
218 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
219 See Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (defining
the test for establishing an involuntary public figure), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
220 See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 540 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118
(2000); see also Wiegel v. Capital Times Co., 426 N.W.2d 43, 49-50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)
(noting that public figure inquiry should focus "on the plaintiff's role in the public controversy
rather than on any desire for publicity or other voluntary act on his or her part").
221 Wells, 186 F.3d at 540.
222 Id.; see also Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 185 (Ga. Ct. App.
2001) (noting that when determining the public figure status of an individual a court must ask
"whether a reasonable person would have concluded that the plaintiff would play or was seeking
to play a major role in determining the outcome of the controversy"), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
814 (2002).
223 See supra Introduction.
224 See supra Introduction, Part A.
225 An alternative argument might rest on whether community notification constitutes a
second punishment for the convicted sex offender. The argument asserts that having already
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The success of the sex offender's argument rests on the ability to differentiate
between the public debate concerning sex offenders and the actual execution of the sex
crime. The fallacy of this argument lies in the misguided belief that the sex offender's
crime hurts only the victims and not the public at large.226 Sex crimes are not com-
mitted in a vacuum in which they damage the victims while inciting the offenders.
27
Instead, sex crimes exist on the dangerous fringe of society that shocks the public con-
science and jeopardizes the vitality of the community.22 Individuals who commit sex
crimes cannot legitimately claim that they are unaware of the serious repercussions
of their conduct, and the ensuing pain it inflicts upon the victims, the community, and
ultimately themselves.229 In addition, the general preference of the sex offender to
served their time in prison, convicted sex offenders are subjected to further punishment upon
their release by having to face the public stigma attached to registration in a community notifi-
cation program. See, e.g., Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex Offender Registration
Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation, and Unintended ResultsAssociated with the Scarlet
Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 788, 815-26 (1996) (arguing that community
notification statutes constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" for convicted sex offenders).
The Supreme Court, however, determined that sex offender notification programs are non-
punitive, and instead are enacted with the purpose of protecting the public from convicted sex
offenders. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 (2003). Furthermore, any stigma that results from
community notification does not make sex offender notification punitive, because such infor-
mation is part of the public record and thus does not constitute the imposition of a significant
"affirmative disability or restraint" on the part of the affected individuals. Id. at 98-100. For
additional discussion relating to the Supreme Court's analysis of the due process rights of
convicted sex offenders, see supra Parts I.C. 1, I.D, II.A.
226 Recent studies concerning the impact of sexual abuse upon the victims and their sur-
rounding communities have refocused the prevention of sexual abuse as a public health issue.
Fran Henry & Keith Kauffman, Introduction to the Special Issue, 11 SExuAL ABUSE: J. RES.
& TREATMENT255,255 (1999); see also, James A. Mercy, Having New Eyes: Viewing Child
SexualAbuse as a Public Health Problem, 11 SEXUALABUSE: J. RES. &TREATMENT 317(1999)
(arguing that defining sexual abuse as a public health problem acknowledges the role that the
community plays in preventing sexual abuse and accordingly gives it a sense of "ownership"
in the fight against sexual abuse); Sandy K. Wurtele, Comprehensiveness and Collaboration:
Key Ingredients of an Effective Public Health Approach to Preventing Child Sexual Abuse,
11 SEXUALABUSE: J. RES. &TREATMENT 323,324 (1999) (arguing that the prevention of sexual
abuse must target "personal, familial, and environmental conditions that both increase and
decrease the likelihood of abuse occurring," and that the effective prevention of sexual abuse,
especially child sexual abuse, requires educating such diverse groups as "parents, professionals,
the general public, and policy makers").
227 See Madeleine Carter et al., Promoting OffenderAccountability and Community Safety
Through the Comprehensive Approach to Sex Offender Management, 34 SETON HAuLL. REV.
1273,1275-76 (2004) (arguing that while community protection from sex offenders has typically
been the "exclusive responsibility of the criminal justice system," a new focus has emerged that
recognizes the importance of community education to combat the danger of sexual violence).
228 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
229 Cf. CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, AN OvERvEw
OF SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT (2002) (stating that "the great majority of sex offenders do
not commit their crimes impulsively without any planning or forethought").
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remain hidden from the public view pales in comparison to the atrocities they have
committed. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that sex offenders can avoid the in-
voluntary public figure label regardless of their preference to shun such publicity.
Under federal regulations, sex offenders are defined as violent individuals who
present a continuing threat to the community.2 Their crime violates both the physical
and mental state of its victims,23' and consequently enflames the public to seek retri-
bution.232 Even if the perpetrator does not foresee the likelihood of the ensuing public
debate caused by his or her actions, the reasonable person certainly does; thus, igno-
rance affords no protection. To attach involuntary public figure status to the legal
record of a sex offender therefore does not signify personal discrimination against
the sex offender's wish to remain private; it instead represents justice.
Ultimately, the determination that sex offenders are public figures rests on two
important principles. First, the sex offender notification debate is a significant public
controversy, and concerns matters vital to promoting public safety.233 Second, sex
offenders are active participants within this debate, and thus it is reasonably fore-
seeable that their relevant conduct will invite public attention.21 It is arguable,
therefore, that sex offenders achieve public figure status under either the limited or
involuntary public figure classes. 5 In addition, the sex offender's public figure status
is particularly significant to media entities, because it elevates the status of the sex
offender debate to a matter of vital public concern while simultaneously immunizing
the media from future liability stemming from defamation lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
As stated from the beginning, this Note's purpose was to demonstrate the media's
right to report on the presence of convicted sex offenders in the community. 236 It was
230 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000).
231 See Roxanne Lieb et al., SexualPredators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME &JUST. 43,48-50
(1998) (noting how victims of sexual abuse may exhibit harmful psychological effects arising
from the sexual offense, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and an inclination toward
unusual sexual behaviors); see also CATHY SPATZWIDOM, NAT'LINST. OFJUSTICE, VICTIMS
OFCH1DHOD ABUSE: LATER CR]MINAL CONSEQUENCES 4-5 (1995) (noting that victims of sex
crimes are at greater risk of arrest later in life than are non-victims, and victims may also be
more likely to run away from home).
232 See Saad, supra note 36 (finding that almost two-thirds of all Americans have little or no
concern for the privacy rights of those individuals affected by sex offender registration and
notification programs).
233 See supra Part II.B.2.
234 See supra Part II.C.
235 See generally W. Wat Hopkins, The Involuntary Public Figure: Not So Dead After All,
21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2003) (arguing that distinctions between the limited purpose
and the involuntary public figure should be abolished in favor of a renewed focus on the
controversy in question).
236 See supra Introduction, Part C.
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suggested that granting this right to the media would accomplish two important objec-
tives. First, granting the media the right to notify would support the First Amendment
interest in protecting the media when reporting on matters of public concern. Hence,
the right to notify would ensure that sex offenders were included within the overall
debate on public safety. Second, sex offenders' increased publicity would heighten
the public's awareness of their presence in the community. This intensified focus on
local sex offenders would assist government-authorized sex offender notification
programs by creating a more informed populace.
These conclusions were supported by two main bodies of law. Initially, the argu-
ment focused on the First Amendment and attempted to discern whether the media
is accorded free speech protection when notifying the public of sex offenders in the
community.237 Crucial to the resolution of this inquiry was the supposition that the
media's right to report on matters of public concern outweighed the competing interest
in the sex offender's right to privacy. This outcome was predicated on the deter-
mination that sex offenders were a viable public concern.
The second main inquiry focused on defamation law and its public figure doc-
trine.3' Foundational to this analysis was the proposition that granting public figure
status to convicted sex offenders would limit the media's liability when notifying the
public of their presence in the community. The determination that sex offenders were
public figures, therefore, rested on the successful conclusion of two critical questions.
First, is the sex offender debate a public controversy? Second, if the sex offender de-
bate is a legitimate public controversy, do sex offenders play an active enough role
within the controversy to merit public figure status? The affirmative answer to each
question was supported by the argument that the characteristics of a sex offender fit
within the narrow class of involuntary public figures.
Consequently, the connection between the First Amendment and the public figure
inquiries rests on the manner in which each body of law analyzes the tension between
the public's right to be informed of matters of public concern and the individual's com-
peting right to keep personal matters private. The tension between the public and
private domain is essential to both legal doctrines, and is essential to the ultimate con-
clusion of this Note. Hence, to successfully determine that the media has a right to
notify the public of the presence of convicted sex offenders in the community, the
public's interest in remaining informed must be deemed greater than the sex offender's
opposing interest in remaining outside the public sphere. Accordingly, the similar
legal principles relevant to both the First Amendment and the public figure doctrines
are appropriate mechanisms in which to analyze the public-private tension.
First Amendment jurisprudence, as it pertains to the media's right to free speech,
generally focuses on the issue of public concern. Specifically, the First Amendment
analysis attempts to discern whether the particular information that is being disputed as
237 See supra Part I.
238 See supra Part II.
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a matter of legitimate public concern is significant enough to outweigh the competing
interests that the disputing party possesses. Likewise, the public figure doctrine also
seeks to differentiate between public and private matters. Unlike First Amendment
jurisprudence, however, the public figure analysis focuses on the public status of the
individual rather than the public status of the information in question to determine
whether the specific individual has a public persona sufficient to warrant increased
public attention. Often the determination of whether the individual is worthy of public
attention centers on the specific controversy in which the individual is embroiled.
Except for those rare cases in which the individual is an all-purpose public figure,
a proper inquiry focuses as much on the public significance of the controversy in
question as it does on the active participation of the individual within the specific con-
troversy. Further, it is arguable that any significant controversy sufficient to bestow
upon an individual public figure status is equally sufficient to merit First Amendment
protection. Accordingly, it may be inferred that the determining factor in each debate
is the fact that sex offender notification is of sufficient public interest to merit First
Amendment protection for the media and correspondingly merit public figure status
for the sex offender.
Currently, the scourge of sex crimes is at the forefront of the national conscious-
ness.239 Highly-publicized sex crime controversies are the impetus behind the resur-
gence of legislation mandating the public registration and subsequent dissemination
of personal information pertaining to individuals who have been previously convicted
of sexual offenses.'v These statutes are enacted with the intent to protect the com-
munity from future tragedy. Hence, sex offender notification statutes stand for the
proposition that information is power, and thus the more information the public
possesses in regards to the proximity of convicted sex offenders within their com-
munities, the less likely it is that future violence will result.
The media's right to notification relies on more than legal doctrine as a suffi-
cient justification; it relies on common sense. It is highly unlikely that any person,
regardless of how adamantly they support the right to privacy, would wish to experi-
ence the tragedy of Jacob Wetterling and his family. Most people, therefore, would
generally support rational measures that might serve to prevent similar tragedies.
Community notification of sex offenders is one such measure used to prevent the future
occurrence of sexually violent crimes. Allowing the media to notify the public of
the presence of convicted sex offenders is a significant tool to help ensure the success
of community notification.
239 See supra Introduction, Part A; see also Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the
Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws,
89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1167 (1999) ("Sex offenders are the scourge of modern
America, the 'irredeemable monsters' who prey on the innocent." (citations omitted)).
24o See supra Introduction, Part A.
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In the end, as acknowledged under the First Amendment, the media is often the
mechanism through which the public becomes informed on important matters. As it
pertains to convicted sex offenders, the media must be allowed to do its job and help
publicize the presence of these potentially dangerous individuals who reside in the
community. Providing the media with anything less undermines the First Amendment
and jeopardizes the safety of our communities.
